The Rohingya population is widely acknowledged as one of the most persecuted minority groups worldwide. The ongoing tripartite conflict involving the Rohingya, the Rakhine, and the Myanmar military has resulted in numerous clashes and massacres, leading to forced displacement. Countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India have recorded an influx of Rohingya immigrants. While extensive studies have been conducted on the Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh, there has been a limited scholarly focus on the Rohingya in India. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature. It is important to note that India is neither a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, which addresses refugee status and protections, nor does it have a domestic refugee law. Consequently, refugees in India are not officially recognized as a distinct group and lack legal protection against exploitation and abuse. This situation leaves them vulnerable to various forms of mistreatment, including exploitation, violence, and limited access to employment, education, and healthcare. Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designates the Rohingya as refugees, the current Bharatiya Janata Party government views this stateless community as illegal migrants and a perceived threat to India. This stance raises important questions: (i) How does the Indian population perceive and internalize this interpretation? (ii) What are their attitudes toward the Rohingya, and what policy options do they prefer? To address these inquiries, the authors of this article analyzed data from the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, a large-scale online survey organized by one of the authors. In addition, interviews were conducted with Rohingya individuals residing in India to gather firsthand perspectives.

1. Introduction

The Rohingya population is widely recognized as one of the most persecuted minorities globally. The ongoing tripartite conflict involving the Rohingya, the Rakhines, and the Myanmar military has resulted in repeated clashes and massacres over the years, leading to forced displacement both within and outside of Myanmar (Hossain et al., 2020; Ware & Laoutides, 2018). While the historical background of the Rohingya crisis extends far back, encompassing events such as World War II and previous instances of massacres and exodus in 1978, 1991/1992, 2012, and 2016, it was in August 2017 that the Myanmar military initiated a brutal campaign against them. This campaign involved ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and exhibited genocidal intent (Human Rights Council, 2019), resulting in one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing refugee crises to date.

The Rohingya migration has been documented in several countries, including Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India (Adiputera & Missbach, 2021; Hoffstaedter, 2017; Jalil & Hoffstaedter, 2023; Stange et al., 2019). While numerous studies have been conducted on the Rohingya population in Myanmar and Bangladesh, including surveys on public perception, limited research has been conducted on the Rohingya in India (Cheesman, 2017; Dussich, 2018; Mallick, 2020; Milton et al., 2017; Ullah, 2016). This article aims to fill the gap in the existing literature by shedding light on this understudied aspect. Previous scholarly work on the Rohingya has primarily focused on socioeconomic, political, and legal issues. For instance, Madhura Chakraborty’s research (2015) examines the socioeconomic aspects of the Rohingya’s lives in their settlements within India (Chakraborty, 2015). Parveen (2018) and Sahoo (2017) have addressed India’s exclusionary policies toward the Rohingya and how these policies have exacerbated the already dire situation faced by the Rohingya (Parveen, 2018; Sahoo, 2017). To bridge the gap in the literature, the article focuses on the Indian (national) public opinion regarding the Rohingya issue and how state policies influence public opinion regarding refugees.

Governments, as architects of immigration and refugee policies, hold a pivotal role in shaping public attitudes. Scholars such as Entman (2012) and De Vreese (2005) have delved into the intricate ways in which government narratives and framing strategies mold public opinion regarding refugees. These narratives encompass diverse facets, including policy goals, portrayals of refugees, and the perceived consequences of immigration. State policies extend beyond their regulatory function, playing a profound role in constructing public discourse (De Coninck, 2019). Immigrants can be framed either as valuable economic contributors or potential security threats, eliciting distinct public reactions (Iyengar, 1990). Moreover, research conducted by Schweitzer et al. (2015) reinforces the idea that both realistic and symbolic threats are integral components of the integrated threat theory. Their work sheds light on the multifaceted nature of prejudice, contributing to a broader comprehension of societal attitudes toward refugees (Schweitzer et al., 2005). In essence, the framing of immigration and refugee issues by government officials has a profound influence on how the public perceives and responds to these policies.

The media emerges as a crucial intermediary in the relationship between state policies and public opinion and also often plays a crucial role in disseminating and reinforcing government messages (Bennett, 1993; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009; Esses et al., 2013; Scheufele, 1999). Negative and sensationalized portrayals contribute to the reinforcement of stereotypes, while responsible reporting has the potential to promote empathy (Schuck & de Vreese, 2009).

The Narrative Policy Framework provides a valuable lens for analyzing the intricate relationship between state policies, narrative elements, and public opinion regarding immigrants and refugees (Shanahan et al., 2011). Existing literature demonstrates the importance of considering government narratives, media amplification, and policy feedback in understanding the dynamic interplay that shapes public attitudes.

In the expansive discourse surrounding the influence of state policies on public attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, the majority of research has been predominantly conducted in Western contexts. A notable gap persists in the research landscape, particularly when considering the South Asian region. The narratives, framing strategies, and policy feedback mechanisms that may be prevalent in this region remain largely unexplored, representing a crucial gap in the existing academic understanding. Recognizing this void, our research endeavors to fill this gap.

India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol, which are specifically designed to address the status and issues faced by refugees. In addition, India does not have any domestic refugee laws in place. Consequently, refugees are not officially recognized as a distinct group, and there is a lack of legal protection to safeguard them against exploitation and abuse. This situation leaves refugees vulnerable to various forms of mistreatment, including exploitation, violence, and limited access to employment, education, and healthcare. The treatment of refugees in India tends to be ad hoc and varies based on the country’s political and security circumstances. While the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognizes the Rohingya as refugees, according to Indian laws and the policies of the current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, this stateless community is considered “foreigners” or “aliens” who have unlawfully/illegally migrated into the country, posing a threat to India’s internal security (Dutta, 2017). Rohingyas are subject to the Foreigners Act of 1946, and the Passport (Entry into India) Act of 1929. This raises important questions: (i) How does the Indian population perceive and accept this legal framework? (ii) How do Indians feel about the Rohingya, and what policy option do they favor regarding their status and presence in India?

To address the aforementioned questions, the authors analyzed survey data obtained from the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey (2022), a large-scale online survey initiated by one of the authors. Only a subset of the data relevant to the objectives of this research is reported in this study, with further details provided in Section 3. The data analysis was carried out using JASP software. In addition to the survey data, one of the authors conducted 50 open-ended and in-depth interviews with Rohingya individuals residing in India in 2021 and 2022. All interviewees were Muslim refugees originating from Myanmar and had been registered with the UNHCR. These interviews, conducted in the Rohingya language through a translator, took place in various settlements across Delhi, Haryana, Hyderabad, Jammu, and Mathura (areas with a notable concentration of Rohingya communities). These interviews employed a semi-structured approach and utilized the snowball sampling method. For this paper, only a selected portion of these interviews is utilized as supplementary evidence to complement the findings derived from the survey data.

This article is organized as follows: following this introduction, which outlines the analytical framework, the situation of the Rohingya in India is described, highlighting the treatment they receive from the Indian government. Subsequently, the perception of the Indian population toward the Rohingya, as well as their policy preference toward these refugees, as revealed through data analysis, is presented. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the key findings of the study.

1.1. The Rohingya in India

India currently hosts a population of over 200,000 refugees, including both mandated and non-mandated individuals, as well as asylum seekers from various countries such as Tibet, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Myanmar (UNHCR India, 2022a). As of October 2022, UNHCR India had registered over 48,000 refugees and asylum seekers, with the majority originating from Myanmar and Afghanistan (UNHCR India, 2022b). Among them, approximately 18,000 are Rohingya (Foundation London Story, 2021), although estimates suggest that their total number in the country is much higher, reaching around 40,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The migration of Rohingya individuals to India is typically categorized as irregular due to their stateless status, lack of identification documents, and inability to utilize legal means of transportation. Consequently, the Rohingya are compelled to rely on irregular methods of travel (Abbas & Hemadri, 2022). The majority of them have migrated from Bangladesh after residing there for a certain period, while only a minority have directly fled from Myanmar, using Bangladesh as a transit country en route to India (Abbas & Hemadri, 2022).

In India, the Rohingya population is not concentrated in a single region, unlike the situation in Cox Bazar, Bangladesh. Instead, they are dispersed throughout the country. According to UNHCR reports, significant Rohingya populations can be found in Delhi, Haryana, Jammu, and Hyderabad, as well as smaller concentrations in Rajasthan, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala (UNHCR, 2019; 2020). Figure A1 illustrates the population distribution of Rohingyas in India. The Rohingya people live in deplorable conditions within their makeshift settlements, or “unauthorized colonies” (Chaudhury & Samaddar, 2018). Their livelihoods are severely restricted by language barriers and security concerns. They also encounter significant challenges, such as limited access to sanitation facilities, a lack of electricity and clean water, open sewage systems, overcrowded living conditions, unhygienic housing conditions, and inadequate medical care. Moreover, their lack of formal identification hinders their ability to access banking services or secure formal employment.

In contrast, Sri Lankan Tamil refugees experienced more favorable treatment from the Indian government, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Crucial factors such as religious and cultural equality, language, and loyalty played pivotal roles in fostering a strong sense of belonging and ensuring their protection (Refworld, 2010). Sri Lankan refugees received extensive assistance, including shelter, food, and healthcare (Hans, 1993). The state government of Tamil Nadu introduced various programs, such as the Integrated Child Development Scheme, infrastructure development initiatives, and 24-h power supply, along with facilitating access to education and medical facilities (Valatheeswaran & Rajan, 2011). This commitment to the welfare of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees is evident in the allocation of funds, the issuance of identity cards, and the provision of essential documents. However, the circumstances of the Rohingya community reveal a markedly different situation.

In general, the Rohingya engage in daily wage labor, often involving tasks like rag picking or working in construction to earn a living. While the UNHCR and its partner organizations, such as Save the Children (Bal Raksha Bharat), Bosco Organization for Social Concern and Operation, Development and Justice Initiative, and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, work toward protecting the rights of the Rohingya and ensuring their access to essential social services and humanitarian aid, the situation on the ground remains dire. Given the dire conditions they face, why did the Rohingya people choose to seek refuge in India? As mentioned earlier, a significant number of Rohingya individuals arrived in India from Bangladesh, primarily through the northeastern borders of West Bengal, utilizing various means of transportation such as trains, cars, buses, and even on foot. In addition, some Rohingya refugees undertook perilous journeys by sea using boats. Many reported paying bribes to agents to cross international borders (Rajan, 2022). There were several push factors that compelled them to migrate from Bangladesh to India. These factors included restricted access to essential services such as education and healthcare, limited opportunities for livelihood, insecurity, poverty, and the relocation of Rohingya individuals to the cyclone-prone island of Bhasan Char (Chakraborty, 2015). On the other hand, various pull factors attracted the Rohingya to India, including employment opportunities, peace, access to education and healthcare services, and the prospect of family reunification (Chakraborty, 2015).

According to scholars, the migration of Rohingya individuals to India dates back to the late 1970s, but the numbers significantly increased after violence erupted in Myanmar in 2012 (Chaudhury & Samaddar, 2018). The UNHCR data reveal that in 2015, there were 18,257 individuals from Myanmar, primarily Chin and Rohingya, residing in India. By 2019, this number had risen to 20,973, and by the end of 2022, it had reached 29,052 (UNHCR India). While Chin people had sought refuge in India since the 1970s, the majority of individuals from Myanmar who arrived in India after 2000 were Rohingya. Following the 2017 massacre in Myanmar, a large number of Rohingya fled to Bangladesh before eventually moving on to India.

The Rohingya community, previously unseen, gained visibility in India on April 9, 2012, when approximately 3000 Rohingya individuals, including men, women, and children, staged a months-long protest in front of the UNHCR office in Delhi. Their objective was to demand refugee status based on legal grounds (Perappadan, 2012). At that time, they possessed “asylum seeker cards,” which did not hold the same legal weight as official documents. Their aim was to access the socioeconomic and legal support provided by UNHCR. Consequently, Rohingya individuals who applied and underwent the Refugee Status Determination process were granted refugee status and later received long-term visas (LTV) that required annual renewal. These documents not only helped them to acquire legal documents such as the Aadhaar card (a valid proof of identity and address issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India) but also enabled them to access various socioeconomic benefits offered by the state.

Despite the gains described above, India did not offer the desired protections to the Rohingya community. Since the pro-Hindu BJP-led NDA government came to power in 2014, the political landscape has shifted, exacerbating the situation for the Rohingya. Various laws and policies have been implemented, particularly in the legal and social domains. One such policy, introduced by the Union Home Ministry in 2017, halted the renewal of LTV for Rohingya individuals (Kumar, 2018). In addition, the government ordered the confiscation and cancellation of all Aadhaar cards held by the Rohingya (Kumar, 2018). As a result, the Rohingya have been severely disadvantaged, as the lack of official identification documents has deprived them of access to healthcare, education, and financial services. Their rights and documents have been stripped away by the host country, in this case, India, as well as previously by their home country, Myanmar (Rohingyas Temporary Registration Cards, known as the “White Cards,” have also been revoked in 2015 before the general elections, effectively disenfranchising them). Consequently, the Rohingya community has been left with no choice but to participate in the informal market, where they are vulnerable to exploitation. Furthermore, in 2017, the government issued orders to identify and deport Rohingya individuals (South China Morning Post, 2018). This process led to a significant number of Rohingya people being arrested and charged with violating the Foreigners Act of 1946 or the Passports (Entry into India) Act of 1929 (Iqbal, 2021). These exclusionary practices not only worsened the situation but also instilled fear. As a result, over 1000 Rohingya individuals fled to Bangladesh to avoid arrest and subsequent deportation (Abbas & Hemadri, 2022).

The exclusionary practices carried out by the Indian state toward the Rohingya community illustrate the three main steps of the securitization of migration theory proposed by the Copenhagen School. The first step involves presenting the Rohingya as a threat to the Indian people, while the second step focuses on convincing the public of the existential danger they pose. Finally, the third step involves legitimizing the implementation of drastic measures by the Indian government (Topulli, 2016). Public attitudes toward refugees can be influenced by various factors. De Coninck (2019) highlights the significance of ethnicity, the economic situation in the refugees’ country of origin, and the region they come from in shaping public perceptions (De Coninck, 2019). Negative portrayals of refugees, such as the belief that they threaten the cultural fabric of the host country or impose an economic and social burden, can lead to a shift in public opinion. The literature acknowledges the impact of framing on public perception, with theories such as social identity and group threat offering explanations. Political framing and media play a crucial role in shaping public opinion through communication frames that encourage citizens to think about an issue in a specific way and adopt certain thought patterns (Chong & Druckman, 2007). These frames often depict refugees as involved in criminal activities, labeling them as “intruders.” Recent studies have demonstrated that the rise in xenophobia and Islamophobia has resulted in more restrictive state policies toward refugees, as observed in the treatment of the Rohingya community in India (Basavapatna, 2018; Chaudhury & Samaddar, 2018).

The escalating concern of the BJP-led NDA government regarding national security, coupled with its stance on religious matters, has led to a more stringent approach toward the Rohingya refugee population. Consequently, instances of detaining and deporting Rohingya refugees from India have become more frequent. Numerous cases have emerged where Rohingya people have been apprehended under the Foreigner Act of 1946 for attempting to cross the border without valid travel documents. One notable incident took place in March 2021, when Indian authorities detained over 150 Rohingya refugees who were residing in the northern region of Jammu and Kashmir (Singh, 2021). Similarly, in July 2023, authorities in Uttar Pradesh arrested and detained 74 Rohingya individuals, including children and a pregnant woman, from multiple towns and cities within the state (Global Detention Project, 2023). The grounds for their detention were their alleged illegal border crossing.

The first recorded case of Rohingya deportation happened in October 2018, involving the deportation of seven Rohingya individuals to Myanmar (Human Rights Watch, 2018). These individuals had been held in detention at the Silchar central prison in Assam since 2012 on charges of illegal entry. Their return to Myanmar exposed them to potential arbitrary arrest, torture, and even death. Following this, India deported another five Rohingya people to Myanmar in January 2019 and an additional seven in October 2019 as part of a broader government crackdown on illegal immigration (Rahman & Pirzada, 2021). The deportation actions have persisted since then. These actions have faced criticism from human rights organizations and activists who contend that Rohingya refugees are fleeing violence and persecution in their home country and should be offered protection and assistance rather than being subjected to detention and deportation.

As a result of the Indian state’s explicit refusal to protect the rights of the Rohingya, they are excluded from legal protection and face another consequence – a lack of support from the general population. Interviews conducted by one of the authors confirm this, revealing that support for the Rohingya among locals is inconsistent. Some individuals, particularly NGO workers, activists, students, and acquaintances, provide support to the Rohingya, while others do not. A Rohingya woman in her fifties from Royal Colony Settlement No. 5, Balapur, Hyderabad, shared her experience, stating, “Locals help sometimes, but not much. Their behavior toward us is generally good. We have a moderate relationship with local people, but in some places, we are viewed with suspicion and hatred” (Personal communication, 2021). Similarly, a Rohingya man in his mid-twenties from Budena Village, Faridabad, Haryana, expressed concerns about discrimination and animosity from some locals: “Sometimes, on our way home from work, they taunt us by referring to us as “people of Burma.” They use abusive language, calling us dirty and wild, and tell us to go back to where we came from” (Personal communication, 2021).

The next section delves into the specific perceptions of the Indian population toward the Rohingya and explores their preferred policy options. The focus extends beyond those who have direct contact with the Rohingya to encompass the nation as a whole, presenting data representative of the entire country.

2. Methods

2.1. Data

The data utilized in this article were obtained from the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, which is part of a global survey project investigating global perceptions of China and other relevant issues through large-scale representative online surveys conducted in various (selected) regions worldwide. It was conducted in three East Asian countries (Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan), six ASEAN countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore), Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan, and supplemented by samples in Australia and New Zealand. In each of the 15 countries, the survey was conducted with a nationally representative quota sample (minimum n = 1200) for gender, age, and region. Each country received the core set of questions, which focused primarily on perceptions of China, along with specific country-related questions (not necessarily related to China), such as the questions used for this research.

The article focuses on the Indian part of the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey. The sample collected in India consists of 1146 respondents and is nationally representative in terms of age, gender, and region. However, the data are skewed toward more educated and urban people (as seen in the demographic breakdown below) as these are the groups of the population that can more easily be reached by online surveying, and this also constituted the limitation of this paper. The responses were collected in Hindi and English from participants registered in national online panels by CINT between August and September 2022. Participants were presented with approximately 60 questions, including a set of about a dozen questions specifically added to the Indian version of the survey.

For the purposes of this paper, the authors focused on a subset of questions related to (i) people’s sentiments toward the Rohingya, (ii) their willingness to resettle the Rohingya in India, and (iii) their opinions on India’s stance toward Rohingya refugees. The first question utilized a 0 – 100 scale, commonly referred to as a “thermometer question,” where 0 represents “cold/negative feelings,” 50 represents “neutrality,” and 100 represents “warm/positive” feelings. The second question employed a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (most negative answer) to 7 (most positive answer). The third question provided four specific response options, including an “I don’t know” option. In addition, the data have been analyzed by disaggregating it based on some of the demographic characteristics, which will be further described in the following section. When applicable, relevant country comparisons have been made using the available data.

2.2. Demographic breakdown

The survey data provided in this article offers a representative representation of the entire population across three demographic factors: gender, age, and region. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the 1146 survey respondents based on the representative demographic factors, as well as education, ethnic identity, language(s) spoken, rural or urban location, religiosity, and political leaning.

Table 1. Demographic data about respondents

In addition, Figure A2 illustrates the geographic distribution of the respondents. Furthermore, the responses to each of the three questions discussed in the previous section were carefully analyzed in relation to some of the aforementioned demographic characteristics. Any noteworthy trends or significant patterns identified during the analysis are reported in the subsequent sections of this paper.

3. Survey results: Indian attitudes toward the Rohingya, their resettlement, and the preferred policy option

3.1. Attitude toward the Rohingya

Comparing the feelings of Indians toward the Rohingya with a few other groups of people (a mix of various ethnicities, nationalities, and religious groups), the results of the survey show that out of the provided groups, Indian people feel the warmest toward the Japanese and the coldest toward the Chinese, followed by the Rohingya (at the same level as the Uyghurs). Feelings toward the Rohingya in the survey are even colder than toward the Muslims in general. With a mean value of 49 (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means “very cold,” 50 means “neutral,” and 100 means “very warm feelings”), Indians seem rather cold toward the Rohingya (Figure 1).

While the overall attitude of Indian respondents toward the Rohingya is predominantly cold, further analysis reveals intriguing patterns when considering other characteristics. Age and gender yield more negative responses, indicating that men and older individuals tend to hold more negative perceptions. Men exhibited more negative views than women. Regional differences did not show significant variation in attitudes. However, religion emerges as a strong predictor. Hindu respondents, comprising 82% of the population, tend to harbor cold feelings toward the Rohingya. On the other hand, Muslim and Christian respondents exhibit warmer sentiments. Moreover, the strength of religious devotion, as measured by their religious practices, correlates with the intensity of these feelings.

Furthermore, when examining party preferences based on the question of which party respondents would vote for if parliamentary elections were held this weekend, it was observed that BJP voters held the coldest feelings toward the Rohingya, with a mean value of 43 on a scale from 0 to 100 (where 0 represents “very cold” feelings and 100 represents “very warm” feelings). Details are provided in Table A1. Conversely, the other two parties that received more than 5% preference among survey respondents (Table A1), namely, the Indian National Congress (INC) and All India Trinamool Congress, displayed relatively warm feelings toward the Rohingya, with mean values of 60 and 63, respectively.

We also conducted a comparison of Indian sentiments toward the Rohingya with those in other Asian countries (Figure A3) that experience Rohingya immigration. The results reveal a clear trend: in countries with the highest influx of Rohingya refugees, namely, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand, the mean values are the lowest, ranging from 43 to 55, with Malaysia having the lowest score. Before the 1990s, Bangladesh and Malaysia embraced compassionate strategies to tackle the Rohingya crisis, including the establishment of refugee camps, the provision of humanitarian aid, and the recognition of Rohingya refugees (Yesmin, 2016). Humanitarian motives guided their actions, stemming from empathy and the importance of international collaboration (Yesmin, 2016). In contrast, Thailand initially overlooked Rohingya protection while assisting other displaced communities (Chaijaroenwatana & Haque, 2020). Subsequent to the 1990s, policies in these nations converged toward deportation and forceful repatriation, pivoting toward safeguarding national interests and security due to concerns such as political tensions, economic strain, biased media portrayal, cultural differences, security fears, historical context, or government stance (Yesmin, 2016). This transition marked a departure from their earlier benevolent approaches, underscoring a focus on countering socioeconomic and security challenges. Conversely, in countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, where the number of Rohingya refugees is relatively small but empathy is higher, the mean values range from 59 to 75. Given India’s relatively limited exposure to the Rohingya, with their small numbers and dispersed distribution across the country rather than concentrated in a specific region, one might expect greater empathy. However, the mean value in India is 49, second only to Malaysia in terms of lower levels of empathy.

3.2. Support for resettlement

The survey asked respondents about their support for the resettlement of the Rohingya in India, using a scale of 1 – 7, where 1 represents “definitely no” and 7 represents “definitely yes.” The overall mean answer was 4.2, indicating a neutral stance on average. This suggests that the issue of resettling the Rohingya is polarizing, as opinions vary among the respondents. Analyzing the frequency distribution (Figure 2), we find that more people expressed agreement to varying degrees with the resettlement of the Rohingya (combining answers 5, 6, and 7, totaling 55%) compared to those who expressed disagreement to varying degrees (combining answers 1, 2, and 3, totaling 40%). Only 5% of the respondents selected the middle option. This distribution demonstrates that opinions on the matter are diverse, with a notable portion of the population supporting the resettlement of the displaced Rohingya people.

When examining the data in relation to demographic variables, similar patterns emerged as in the previous question. While the region did not show any correlation, there were strong correlations with gender and age. This means that men and older individuals, in general, tend to be against the resettlement of the Rohingya. Religion also displayed the same pattern as before. Hindus, who make up the majority of the Indian population, are generally opposed to resettlement, while Muslims are in favor. Christians, although to a lesser extent, also show support, with the correlation being strengthened by religious devotion. Furthermore, individuals who hold warm feelings toward the Rohingya (as discussed in the previous section) also demonstrate a higher tendency to support their resettlement. Regarding voter preference, once again, BJP voters (comprising 56% of the respondents) displayed the lowest willingness to resettle the Rohingya in India (Table A2).

After comparing the levels of willingness to resettle the Rohingya in Asian countries where Rohingya migration occurs, India falls in the middle with a mean value of 4.2 (Figure A4). This places India at a similar level to countries such as the Philippines and Thailand. Among the countries surveyed, Indonesians and Pakistanis show the highest willingness to resettle the Rohingya, while Bangladeshis and Malaysians demonstrate the lowest willingness.

3.3. Policy preference

When presented with specific policy options on how to deal with Rohingya refugees, 30% of Indian respondents expressed a preference for intervention to stop the flow of refugees, 20% favored repatriation (sending them back to Myanmar), and another 20% supported providing them with asylum in India (Figure 3). Notably, 29% of surveyed individuals selected the option “I don’t know,” indicating uncertainty or a lack of a clear stance on the matter.

It is important to note that the survey employed a split ballot question, meaning that approximately half of the respondents (564 individuals) were asked about the Rohingya specifically, while the other half (582 individuals) were asked about refugees from Myanmar in general, considering the influx of people fleeing the country following the military coup in 2021. Comparing the responses of these two groups, no significant differences were found. Both groups exhibited similar preferences, with 19% favoring asylum, 25% preferring repatriation, 30% supporting intervention to stop the flow of refugees, and 26% selecting the “I don’t know” option. This suggests that the attitudes of the Indian population toward refugees, whether Rohingya or from Myanmar in general, are not specifically targeted against any particular group but rather reflect a general stance toward refugees as a whole.

Since this question was only asked in India as part of the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, comparisons with other countries are not possible. However, when analyzing specific variables, some interesting trends emerge (Table 2). In terms of gender distribution, more women are willing to provide asylum (22%) compared to men (17%). Conversely, more men express a desire to repatriate the Rohingya (24%) compared to women (16%), and a higher percentage of men wish to intervene to stop the flow of refugees (33%) compared to women (26%). Among respondents aged 18 – 25, the most common response was “I don’t know” (38%), indicating uncertainty. On the other hand, respondents above 25 years of age were more inclined to choose the option of intervening to stop the flow of refugees.

Table 2. Attitudes toward Rohingya asylum and refugee policies by various demographic and political factors

When examining regional divisions, respondents from Central India were the most inclined to provide asylum (23%), while those from Northeast India expressed the least willingness (6%). Religious identity plays a significant role in preferred policy options. The Hindu population shows a clear preference for intervening to stop the flow of refugees (34%), while Muslims tend to favor providing asylum to the Rohingya (33%). Christians, Buddhists, and individuals of other religions mostly selected the “I don’t know” option.

Looking at voters of specific political parties, supporters of the TMC (All India Trinamool Congress) exhibit a preference for providing asylum, while voters of the BJP and INC lean toward intervening to stop the flow of refugees.

4. Discussion

The survey results revealed that Indians generally hold negative views toward the Rohingya, with particularly strong sentiments among old Hindu men. Moreover, supporters of the BJP also tend to harbor negative feelings toward the Rohingya. Conversely, Muslims and Christians demonstrate a greater level of sympathy, particularly when their religious devotion is strong.

In India, both voting preference and religion significantly influence attitudes toward the Rohingya. The BJP, as a dominant political party in the country, influences its supporters to align with their party’s or government’s stance. Religion also exerts a strong influence: the majority of Indians, including BJP voters, are Hindus and often hold negative perceptions of the Rohingya. In contrast, Muslims and Christians are more likely to have positive views, with Muslims expressing solidarity toward fellow Muslims and Christians exhibiting a general sense of compassion.

India’s overall attitude toward the Rohingya aligns with that of other Asian countries where significant Rohingya migration has occurred, although it is less pronounced in India. Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. India’s predominantly Hindu population and the current government’s affiliation with the RSS (a Hindu nationalist organization known for promoting animosity against Muslims) have contributed to a rise in violence against Muslims, which often goes unpunished.

Furthermore, negative sentiments toward the Rohingya can be attributed to their secondary movements through Bangladesh. India has long faced the challenge of a significant influx of Bangladeshi migrants. The Indian government tends to conflate the issue of Rohingya migration with that of Bangladeshi migrants, viewing both groups as placing a burden on the Indian economy. Consequently, Rohingya individuals are often perceived as migrants rather than refugees, given their extended stay in Bangladesh before arriving in India. Moreover, the government highlights the religious aspect, distinguishing between the acceptance of Hindu migrants from Bangladesh and the less favorable treatment of Muslim migrants. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the question of supporting the resettlement of the Rohingya in India is a divisive one. Those who tend to oppose their resettlement are typically men and older individuals. Among party affiliations, BJP supporters exhibit the lowest willingness to allow Rohingya resettlement in India. Similarly, religious affiliation continues to play a significant role, with Hindus leaning against resettlement, Muslims in favor, and Christians, although to a lesser extent, expressing support. In addition, those who hold positive sentiments toward the Rohingya are more likely to support their resettlement, which aligns logically.

In comparison to other countries, India occupies a middle ground when it comes to the issue of resettlement. It is important to note that India has a relatively smaller Rohingya population, and thus, public opinion may not be based on personal experiences with the Rohingya themselves but rather influenced by the government’s rhetoric. Negative depictions of the Rohingya, including labeling them as illegal and a threat to the security of India, have the potential to alter how the general public perceives them (Chakraborty, 2018). This change in perception is often driven by the framing of the issue by politicians and the media. As an example, consider events like those that took place in December 2019, when Union Home Minister Amit Shah addressed the Lok Sabha by stating that “Rohingyas will never be accepted in India,” reiterating that they entered the country through Bangladesh (The Statesman, 2019). Similarly, in July 2023, another leader from the BJP, Himanta Biswa Sarma, expressed concern about Rohingya infiltration, deeming it “alarming” and a threat to the security of the nation (Outlook, 2023). These instances highlight how prominent political figures can influence public discourse by making strong statements regarding the Rohingya, thus contributing to a particular narrative about the Rohingya community and their presence in India.

The role of media and information dissemination also plays a significant role. Media outlets serve as a critical intermediary between the government’s stance and public perception. If the media amplifies the government’s concerns about security risks or economic burdens associated with refugees, the public is more likely to internalize these viewpoints as their own. Media framing shapes discourse, influencing how people understand and engage with complex issues like refugee crises. The media assumes a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of contemporary nation states and in fostering a shared understanding. It functions as a platform through which specific nationalist ideologies are promoted, employing the interplay of discourse and ideology to portray refugees and migrants as outsiders within the nation state. An empirical analysis conducted by Awny (2019) focusing on two Indian newspapers, the Times of India and the Hindustan Times, reveals that these platforms tend to frame Rohingyas in India using the “intruder” narrative (Awny, 2019). Mohanty’s study (2020) further asserts that visual media plays a role in constructing a negative portrayal of Rohingyas, contributing to the cultivation of a public narrative tied to notions of nationalism (Mohanty, 2020).

Political leaders and media outlets wield substantial influence in molding public sentiment using communication strategies that prompt citizens to consider the matter from a particular perspective and internalize specific thought processes. In essence, these forces shape how people think about refugee-related matters and encourage them to adopt particular viewpoints. The Indian population has adopted the government’s interpretation and stance toward the Rohingya (and refugees in general) as their own. Perceiving them as potential threats or dangers (not necessarily physical), the public tends to either support or at least not oppose the government’s measures against the Rohingya. It is important to highlight that this sentiment is not directed solely at the Rohingya but extends to refugees in general. The preferred policy option is to intervene to curb the influx of refugees. In line with this approach, India has taken several steps regarding the Rohingya. In 2012, during a visit by then-External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to Rakhine State, India announced a relief assistance package of US$1 million for Myanmar (Yhome, 2018). In 2017, India implemented a project called “Operation Insaniyat” in Bangladesh to provide relief assistance to Rohingya refugees (Ferdous, 2021). This operation included multiple rounds of aid, delivering essential supplies such as rice, lentils, milk, raincoats, gumboots, kerosene oil, and kerosene stoves. According to Yhome (2018), Delhi’s decision to assist Rohingya refugees carried an underlying intention to discourage their entry into India. In 2018, an agreement between Myanmar and the UN was reached to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees, with India contributing by constructing 250 houses for refugees in Rakhine State in preparation for their return (Yhome, 2018).

5. Conclusion

Historically, India has been known as a “safe haven” for refugees. However, in recent decades, India’s response to incoming refugees has undergone a transformation. The current political climate has made it more difficult for the Rohingyas to seek asylum in India. The government has implemented various restrictions on their entry and movement, significantly hindering their ability to find safety and security. This contemporary environment not only shapes the policies and laws concerning the Rohingya but also influences public opinion, as the population has largely aligned with the government’s stance.

The findings of the survey suggest that the overall perception of the Rohingya among Indians tends to be significantly negative, even more so than the perception of Muslims in general. The stance toward the Rohingya is strongly influenced by both voting preference and religious affiliation. Specifically, individuals who identify as Hindus and support the BJP tend to hold the most negative views toward the Rohingya. On the other hand, Muslims and Christians exhibit more positive views, with Muslims demonstrating a sense of solidarity and Christians expressing compassion toward the Rohingya.

India’s overall stance toward the Rohingya reflects patterns seen in other Asian countries with significant Rohingya migration, even though India has not seen a substantial influx of Rohingya refugees. This alignment can be attributed to India’s predominantly Hindu population and the rise of violence against Muslims under the current government. The negative sentiments are further fueled by the association of Rohingya migration with the long-standing issue of Bangladeshi migrants, which is viewed as an economic burden by the government. Resettling the Rohingyas in India is divisive, with religious affiliation playing a significant role. Hindus generally oppose resettlement, while Muslims tend to support it. Notably, BJP supporters exhibit the least willingness to accept Rohingya resettlement. Since the Rohingya population in India is relatively small and dispersed, public opinion is more influenced by government rhetoric than by personal experiences with the Rohingya themselves. As a result, the Indian population largely adopts the government’s perspective, perceiving the Rohingya as a potential threat. While not actively endorsing government measures against the Rohingya, Indians generally do not oppose them either.